

The Global Justice Game: Coordinator's Manual©

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Draft: July 17, 2007

Case: **Making a Better World: The Capstone Case**

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This manual assumes that you are familiar with the material in the Participant's Manual. It provides the additional information you need to run the game and conduct the debriefing in which most of the actual learning takes place.

SET-UP

*** Each participant should have a *name tag* with the team they represent prominently displayed and space for the participant to add his or her own name as well.

The ideal physical space consists of the following:

*** A large room with 10-14 small tables (seating 2-5 people).

*** A set of 2 or 3 conference rooms off the large room, at least one with a table large enough to accommodate about a dozen people plus observers.

*** Each of the small tables with a name plate identifying the team whom the particular participants are representing.

*** (Optional) The small tables should be divided into clusters:

Cluster One: A-Team, WTO, U.S. State Department, European Union

Cluster Two: Fabrikistan, Banglabush, Plantanoguary

Cluster Three: Campaign for Labor Rights (CLR), Interfaith Coalition, Women's Global Alliance, Plantanoguary Popular Movement (PPM).

You are unlikely to have such ideal space available, so you should try to adapt your actual space to get as close to it as possible. For example, in a class room with moveable chairs but no tables, you can rearrange the chairs into small circles for each team and try to save one section of the room for meetings which may require a larger circle. The teams can be arranged in the clusters suggested above to ease communication during the negotiation phase of the game. Having one or more extra rooms available allows for additional flexibility.

SINGLE CASE VERSUS MULTIPLE CASES

The game is designed so that the coordinator can run only one of the cases or several of them. There are strong advantages in running multiple cases, including:

*** In representing any particular team, the participants are encouraged to look at the global system from the perspective of that particular team. But the object of the game is to get participants to take a perspective that transcends the parochial view of any particular team. By having the same participants represent different types of teams in different cases, they are moved toward this broader perspective.

*** Each of the cases raises a different set of globalization issues – sweatshops, debt crises, intellectual property concerns, bio-piracy, consumerism, etc. Any single case is necessarily incomplete.

*** The capstone case, Making a Better World, can be played most effectively by participants after they have played several specific cases.

Since each case takes 3-4 hours as a minimum, running multiple cases requires either a semester long course format or a 3-5 day workshop. The course format is ideal since it allows for relevant reading, papers, and discussion beyond the actual playing of the game.

Playing a single case is still a stimulating learning experience for participants and different scenarios allow the coordinator to pick a case that is especially appropriate for a particular course or social action group. The post-game discussion is especially crucial in such circumstances since this is the point when participants are asked to step back from the perspective of their particular team and adopt a more transcendental perspective on global issues.

ABRIDGING THE RESOURCE KIT

The Resource Kit provided has materials relevant for the entire set of 7 scenarios. In running any particular scenario, you may wish to prepare an abridged edition to have copies available during the session for players to consult. You can do this by eliminating parts that are not relevant for particular scenarios.

For **Making a Better World**, eliminate the following sections:

Notes and References for the following teams: CDI, HAZMAT, Poquita Banana, Progressive Caucus, AFL-CIO, Louisiana Support Network, RA-RA, BPM, FIJ, Islamic Labor Forum, WUSA, EuroPress, Liberation Press, Voice of Islam. Eliminate the sections on A-Team Special Programs, SAPs, Loan Guarantees, SLAPPs, WHO, Ecotourism, Political Islam, ATCA, Zones of Action.

ASSIGNING PARTICIPANTS TO TEAMS

Ideally, you should assign the participants to teams before they convene to play the game, allowing them to read over the Participant's Manual and the Portfolio for their team in advance. You may use (a) random assignment, or (b) placing participants on teams that support their perspective, or (c) placing people on teams that give them an unfamiliar perspective. We strongly recommend the last method if you have sufficient information on the participants to implement it. Giving people an unfamiliar perspective pushes them to understand the worldview of groups with whom they are not necessarily sympathetic and perhaps even regard as an enemy. Such an exercise often proves to be a valuable learning experience for participants. If the game is being used as part of an activist workshop, it gives the participants a better understanding of how their adversaries think and why they act as they do. Such knowledge is helpful in designing one's own action strategies to bring about change.

The A-Team and WTO teams are the most demanding in terms of needed sophistication and might be overwhelming for some participants. If the participants play more than one case of the game, you should make sure that you rotate them among teams, giving them as many different perspectives as possible over the course of several cases.

Having multiple participants for each role is desirable but not absolutely necessary. The game is designed to have teams deliberate and think through their action options before deciding and the internal interaction within teams is an important part of the learning experience. However, it can be run with some teams represented by a single participant.

Assigning Participants

Each participant should have a copy of the Participant's Manual and the portfolio for his or her particular team. Resource Kits, preferably abridged for the particular scenario, should be available during the game for reference.

- Set up for different numbers of participants: Approximate range: 15-75.
- First 15: Government of Plantanoguay (2), Government of Fabrikistan (2), Government of Banglabush (2), Plantanoguay Popular Movement (2), and one person each for the other 7 teams.
- #16- 26: Assign people in the following order: A-Team, WTO, U.S. State Department, European Union, Campaign for Labor Rights, Women's Global Alliance, Interfaith Coalition, Government of Plantanoguay, Government of Fabrikistan, Government of Banglabush, PPM.
- #27-37: Follow same order as #16-26 above.
- #38-48: Follow same order as #16-26 above.
- #49-59: Follow same order as #16-26 above.
- #60-70: Follow same order as #16-26 above.
- #71-81: Follow same order as #16-26 above.

COORDINATORS' ROLE DURING PLAY OF THE GAME

Assistance.

A coordinator, especially one running the game for the first time, would be well advised to seek one or more fellow coordinators or assistants. This makes it easier to keep track of things and to divide up some of the tasks. For example, one coordinator can collect and keep track of the access forms that the various teams submit, leaving the other coordinators free to deal with other tasks. It is also helpful to be able to talk things over and make collective judgments where required in calculating team scores, using the scoring sheets discussed below.

Preparation. You will need the following materials during the course of play.

*** The set of Scoring Sheets (separate document). You will need these to calculate the results after the teams hand in their Action Forms at the end of Phase Four and vote and make recommendations in Phase Five.

During Play

General: The role of the coordinator is not to direct play but to facilitate it. Don't try to micro-manage player activities, discussion, or action decisions. Instead, step back and let players move the scenario in their own direction, within the constraints provided by the rules. (Sometimes, however, particular teams will seem to be stuck and the coordinator may want to make a tentative suggestion or two to get them started.) During much of the game, your role will be simply:

*** To move the players along when a phase is nearing completion

*** To answer questions about ambiguities in the rules.

*** To make sure that participants understand what they are supposed to be doing in each phase of the game.

*** To observe and take notes.

Phase One: **Strategic Planning.** (Suggested length: 30-50 minutes)

Your main task is to collect the Priority Rating for Committees, one for each team, at the end of this phase. The team portfolios include a copy of this form.

Phase Two: **Committee Meetings and Negotiation** (suggested length: 50-75 minutes).

Your main task is to collect Committee Report Forms, one for each committee, at the end of this phase. Copies of the form are included in the Participant's Manual.

Phase Three: **Proposal Presentations** (suggested length: 30-50 minutes)

Your task is to listen to the presentations and to ask for clarifications if you feel something is unclear in the proposal.

Phase Four: **Action Decisions** (30-50 minutes).

Your task is to make sure that voting teams (conference participants) have filled out their voting forms from their portfolio to use in the final phase and that all teams hand in their Action Options (one per team, using the form in the Participant's Manual).

Phase Five: **Voting and Recommendations** (30 minutes)

You should take a roll-call vote of conference participants with each team receiving one vote. A Vote Recording Form is provided in this manual to keep track. Proposals need a simple majority of conference participants to pass (4 or more out of 7). You will need to collect a Proposal Recommendation Form from each observer team for each proposal that passes.

POST-GAME DISCUSSION (30-50 minutes)

This is the heart of the learning experience. During the play of the game, if participants are engaged, they do not have much time or occasion to reflect on what is happening. Furthermore, if they play only one case, they have been viewing the world from the perspective of a particular team. The objective of the post-game discussion is to get them to step back and view the global system in a way that transcends the perspective of any particular team.

Timing of the Discussion

If circumstances permit, it is desirable to wait a day or more before holding this discussion rather than holding it immediately after having completed play. This delay allows the coordinators better to prepare for the discussion and allows those participants who are so inclined to reflect on the experience. This will also allow the coordinators to calculate the results in a less hurried manner.

Phases of Discussion

Written evaluations (10 minutes). Using the evaluation form provided in the Participant's Manual, please have participants fill out copies, collect them, and mail them to:

Bill Gamson, 5 Boston Hill Road, Chilmark, MA 05235. U.S.A.

Please include a copy of the Coordinator's Evaluation form included in this Manual.

The discussion can be divided as follows:

On the mechanics of the game:

- *** How easy or difficult was it to play?
- *** Were the materials confusing in any way?
- *** Was there too much to absorb in too little time?

Interpreting the results:

It is important that participants understand that their different team scores are not really comparable. If the WTO goes up seven points and the Government of Plantanoguay goes down three points, this does not indicate that the WTO played more skillfully than Plantanoguay. They have very different success indicators and obstacles to raising them. The meaningful comparison is with the scores of their team in other runs of the same scenario.

To prepare for this part of the discussion, the coordinator should visit the Community Forum on the website as described below. We have posted on the Community Forum, the Summary of Results of other trial runs of the same scenario. These are available for you to examine in preparing for the post-game discussion. You should take notes on interesting and typical results from other runs of the same scenario to share with participants. Once there are a sufficient number of runs of any given scenario, we will compile the range of scores for each of the teams, to be periodically updated as new results are posted. This will help participants to evaluate how their own scores compare.

Questions for discussion in this phase:

*** Does the summary of results contain any important omissions or errors?

*** Do you have any questions about what raised or lowered your team's overall success score?

*** How realistic does the game seem to you? (After the participants have had a chance to answer, the coordinators should be prepared to discuss what, in their judgment, is realistic and what is unrealistic. Where the model seems deficient in some regard, they should indicate how they would suggest changing it to increase its verisimilitude.)

Examining the Model.

Once you are reasonably confident that participants understand the content of the model, it is time for a critical look at the world it models. This may be done as part of the post-game discussion or in a separate session.

The question for discussion (or written work) becomes:

*** To the extent that the outcomes seem to be realistic, what would one have to change in the real world to produce different outcomes? (For example, change the accountability structure of the WTO in a specified way so that it is more responsive to the needs of the Global South.)

Community Forum

We need your cooperation in providing data for your own runs of the game. To post your Summary of Results, please follow the step by step instructions below:

Please visit the Global Justice Game website, located at: www.globaljusticegame.mrap.info and click on the Community Forum link. If you have not done so already, you will need to complete a quick and easy registration to use the forum. You can do so by clicking the “register” link located under the title. You will need to provide a valid e-mail address (preferably one which you use regularly). We do not share your e-mail address with anyone, and use it only to contact you with occasional Global Justice Game news, such as major updates.

Once you are registered, post a summary of your results, including the final scores, in the section titled “Results of Previous Games.” You will find separate discussion boards for each of the scenarios, each with sample posts on which you can base your post with your own results. Please remember to include the date when and location where you ran the scenario, and the name of the coordinator. With your results, we will soon be able to compile scores for your comparison.

The forum also provides boards for participants to further discuss with one another their experiences with the game, and a communal space in which coordinators can ask and answer questions about any aspect of the game, from simple logistics to sociological theory surrounding the game, so please encourage your participants to visit the forum and to use it as a supplement to the game. Think of the forum as you would any other community of peers, and be creative—unique input provides valuable insights for everyone who runs the game.

Scoring Sheets

For each team, there is a table that indicates the consequences of their own action choices and the action choices of other teams for their success indicators. The table also indicates the effects of media coverage on these indicators. The scoring sheets make explicit the model underlying the game and the assumptions on which it is based. Where the reasons for the particular values selected may not be clear, footnotes provide explanations. Making the assumptions explicit enables the coordinators to call into question the particular values attached. If a value seems too high or too low or even in the wrong direction, then the coordinators can change these values when calculating changes in the success indicators.

The teams are given a set of action options available to them but they are also encouraged to think of other actions that are not listed. They must check these additional actions with the coordinators for a ruling on whether they would be possible in the real world. The coordinators must be careful not to rule out an action because it is unlikely to be taken by the real world counterpart. The question is not whether the actor in the real world *would* take such an action but whether it *could*.

The Scoring Sheets contain question marks for the impact of unlisted actions on the team's success indicators. For such cases, the coordinators must supply the figures, making their best guess on how, for example, the price of a company's stock or its public reputation might be affected by the action taken. The values in the table for listed actions will provide guidelines for this judgment, allowing you to compare the unlisted action with the impact of those already specified. It is very helpful, at this point, for coordinators to be able to discuss these values briefly and to make a collective judgment as they compile final scores.

The coordinators should take notes on which actions were especially important in accounting for the rise and fall of particular indicators for the different players. This will be useful in preparing the Summary of Results.

The Scoring Sheets provide a final score for each of the teams on its relevant success indicators. They are useful for discussion but participants should understand that different teams do not face obstacles of equal difficulty. The real comparison is with how well the team which they played has scored in other runs of the game. This information is available in the community forum section of the game website.

VOTING ROLL CALL Form

Name of proposal: _____
(check one) ___ Presented as is. ___ Presented with specified changes or additions.

(Note: Proposals need at least four votes in favor to pass.)

	In favor	Opposed	Abstain
Government of Plantanoguary	___	___	___
Government of Fabrikistan	___	___	___
Government of Banglabush	___	___	___
Campaign for Labor Rights (CLR)	___	___	___
Interfaith Coalition	___	___	___
Women's Global Alliance	___	___	___
Plantanoguary Popular Movement (PPM)	___	___	___
Final vote = (number)	___	___	___

Name of proposal: _____
(check one) ___ Presented as is. ___ Presented with specified changes or additions.

(Note: Proposals need at least four votes in favor to pass.)

	In favor	Opposed	Abstain
Government of Plantanoguary	___	___	___
Government of Fabrikistan	___	___	___
Government of Banglabush	___	___	___
Campaign for Labor Rights (CLR)	___	___	___
Interfaith Coalition	___	___	___
Women's Global Alliance	___	___	___
Plantanoguary Popular Movement (PPM)	___	___	___
Final vote = (number)	___	___	___

Name of proposal: _____
(check one) ___ Presented as is. ___ Presented with specified changes or additions.

(Note: Proposals need at least four votes in favor to pass.)

	In favor	Opposed	Abstain
Government of Plantanoguary	___	___	___
Government of Fabrikistan	___	___	___
Government of Banglabush	___	___	___
Campaign for Labor Rights (CLR)	___	___	___
Interfaith Coalition	___	___	___
Women's Global Alliance	___	___	___
Plantanoguary Popular Movement (PPM)	___	___	___
Final vote = (number)	___	___	___

Name of proposal: _____
 (check one) ☐ Presented as is. ☐ Presented with specified changes or additions.
 (Note: Proposals need at least four votes in favor to pass.)

	In favor	Opposed	Abstain
Government of Plantanoguary	_____	_____	_____
Government of Fabrikistan	_____	_____	_____
Government of Banglabush	_____	_____	_____
Campaign for Labor Rights (CLR)	_____	_____	_____
Interfaith Coalition	_____	_____	_____
Women's Global Alliance	_____	_____	_____
Plantanoguary Popular Movement (PPM)	_____	_____	_____
Final vote = (number)	_____	_____	_____

 Name of proposal: _____
 (check one) ☐ Presented as is. ☐ Presented with specified changes or additions.
 (Note: Proposals need at least four votes in favor to pass.)

	In favor	Opposed	Abstain
Government of Plantanoguary	_____	_____	_____
Government of Fabrikistan	_____	_____	_____
Government of Banglabush	_____	_____	_____
Campaign for Labor Rights (CLR)	_____	_____	_____
Interfaith Coalition	_____	_____	_____
Women's Global Alliance	_____	_____	_____
Plantanoguary Popular Movement (PPM)	_____	_____	_____
Final vote = (number)	_____	_____	_____

 Name of proposal: _____
 (check one) ☐ Presented as is. ☐ Presented with specified changes or additions.
 (Note: Proposals need at least four votes in favor to pass.)

	In favor	Opposed	Abstain
Government of Plantanoguary	_____	_____	_____
Government of Fabrikistan	_____	_____	_____
Government of Banglabush	_____	_____	_____
Campaign for Labor Rights (CLR)	_____	_____	_____
Interfaith Coalition	_____	_____	_____
Women's Global Alliance	_____	_____	_____
Plantanoguary Popular Movement (PPM)	_____	_____	_____
Final vote = (number)	_____	_____	_____

RESULTS Form

The final outcome of proposals adopted by the conference depend on the recommendations of the observer teams as follows where:

a = active opposition; b = passive opposition; c = abstention; d = support

Adopted As Is requires: d = 2 or more, a = 0 *and* b = 1 or less

Modified Adoption requires: d = 1, a = 0, *and* b = 1 or less

Stalled: a = 2 or more; *or* d = 0; *or* (a + b) = 4

Token: All other combinations

Name of Proposal _____

(check one) ____ Passed as is ____ Passed with some change from original

<u>Observer Team</u>	Recommendation				
	<u>a</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>c</u>	<u>d</u>	
A-Team	___	___	___	___	
WTO	___	___	___	___	
U.S. State Department	___	___	___	___	
European Union	___	___	___	___	
Total =	___	___	___	___	Result = _____

Name of Proposal _____

(check one) ____ Passed as is ____ Passed with some change from original

<u>Observer Team</u>	Recommendation				
	<u>a</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>c</u>	<u>d</u>	
A-Team	___	___	___	___	
WTO	___	___	___	___	
U.S. State Department	___	___	___	___	
European Union	___	___	___	___	
Total =	___	___	___	___	Result = _____

Name of Proposal _____

(check one) ☐ Passed as is ☐ Passed with some change from original

<u>Observer Team</u>	Recommendation				
	<u>a</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>c</u>	<u>d</u>	
A-Team	_____	_____	_____	_____	
WTO	_____	_____	_____	_____	
U.S. State Department	_____	_____	_____	_____	
European Union	_____	_____	_____	_____	
Total =	_____	_____	_____	_____	Result = _____

Name of Proposal _____

(check one) ☐ Passed as is ☐ Passed with some change from original

<u>Observer Team</u>	Recommendation				
	<u>a</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>c</u>	<u>d</u>	
A-Team	_____	_____	_____	_____	
WTO	_____	_____	_____	_____	
U.S. State Department	_____	_____	_____	_____	
European Union	_____	_____	_____	_____	
Total =	_____	_____	_____	_____	Result = _____

Name of Proposal _____

(check one) ☐ Passed as is ☐ Passed with some change from original

<u>Observer Team</u>	Recommendation				
	<u>a</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>c</u>	<u>d</u>	
A-Team	_____	_____	_____	_____	
WTO	_____	_____	_____	_____	
U.S. State Department	_____	_____	_____	_____	
European Union	_____	_____	_____	_____	
Total =	_____	_____	_____	_____	Result = _____

Coordinator Evaluation Form

Date of Trial Run _____ Coordinator _____

Case _____

1. To what extent and in what ways did the game meet your objectives as a coordinator?

2. To what extent and in what ways did the game fail to meet your objectives or expectations?

3. Do you have any suggestions to improve the game in general without regard to any particular case?

4. Do you have any suggestions on how to make the particular scenario more effective?

5. Do you have any plans for using the Global Justice Game in the future?

Appendix A: Example of a Summary of Results

Trial Run of **Making a Better World**

Place: Boston College (Matt Williams)

Date of run: April, 2007

Actions Taken

The conference participants decided to set up committees on 1) trade, 2) debt relief, and 3) corporate regulation.

1. The Trade Committee adopted proposal 4, which requires WTO members to respect the ILO Fundamental Conventions and authorizes the WTO to enforce them through applying sanctions to violating countries. This proposal was unanimously endorsed by the conference participants. Three out of the four observer teams--the US State Department, European Union and WTO--chose to endorse it as well (with the A-Team emphatically rejecting it), which means it will be actually implemented by the WTO.

2. The Debt Relief Committee adopted a modified version of proposal 5, which would create an International Insolvency Court (IIC), which would provide arbitration for all debt crises. The Committee modified the proposal so that the Court would not be required to recognize the principal of odious debt. They also agreed that the Court would be composed of a five member panel, including two US representatives, two EU representatives and one third-world representative. All decisions made by the court must pass by a 4/5 majority. This proposal was unanimously endorsed by the conference participants. The four observer teams also chose to endorse it, which means the Court will actually be set up.

3. The Corporate Regulation Committee adopted a modified version of proposal 1, creating an International Investment Agreement (IIA). The resulting UN treaty organization, the Core Standards Commission, would have the ability to monitor corporations to ensure that they abide by labor safety standards and environmental standards only, with monitoring taking place at no cost to corporations. All other domains and any reference to other UN treaties were struck from the agreement, though the Commission retains the right to levy fines equal to 115% of the profits resulting from violating the agreement. Also struck from the agreement was the clause granting corporations the right of due process and compensation for expropriation. The Core Standards Commission will be made up of one US representative, one EU representative, one corporate representative and two social group representatives. Signatory countries

agree that they will not trade with any country that does not sign the IIA. This proposal was unanimously endorsed by the conference participants. The four observer teams also chose to endorse it, which means the Commission will actually be set up.

4. Plantanoguay and Fabrikistan took the lead in putting together a bloc of middle-income countries which will use their resources to help low-income countries in paying off their debts to the A-Team. Because Banglabush chose not to sign on to this compact for fear of offending the first-world powers, they will not benefit from it.

5. In response, the US State Department and EU criticized Plantanoguay, Fabrikistan and other such countries for squandering their resources on people of other countries instead of spending it on their own citizens; and set up a joint program to deliver aid to the people of Plantanoguay and Fabrikistan through civil society organizations.

6. CLR, the Interfaith Coalition, WGA and PPM set up an international coalition called the Z-Team to do several things:

- a. Undertake an educational campaign in support of the proposals of the conference;

- b. Organize a campaign of protest against the A-Team, with all teams taking green zone actions, the PPM taking yellow zone actions, and the Interfaith Coalition taking red zone actions; and

- c. Organize protests against the International Insolvency Court to pressure them to grant broad debt forgiveness.

Scores

I have made the following assumptions in scoring the various teams:

1. Elite actors, both political and economic, first-world and third-world, generally reacted unfavorably to the decision to have the WTO enforce the ILO fundamental conventions, since all these actors depend on weak labor to maximize their profits and this provides a way of enforcing labor rights. At the same time, supporters of social movements were only weakly supportive of the reform, because its enforcement will be in the hands of the WTO, which has never been very labor friendly; and because of fears that sanctions will be selectively applied for reasons having nothing to do with labor rights, but more to do with the North's geopolitical agenda, the way human rights are nowadays. (There is, in fact, in the real world a great deal of debate on the left over the merits of having the WTO enforce labor rights for these very reasons.)

2. IIC attracted broad support. (A similar proposal made some headway in the real world, before being shot down by the Bush administration.) First world economic and political elites see it as a way of ensuring economic stability, by providing a mechanism for relieving the worst debts, thus allowing countries (like those of sub-Saharan Africa) in deep economic crisis because of debt to be made safe for investment; at the same time, the composition of the panel ensures that it will be fairly conservative about the cases in which it does actually grant debt relief. Third-world elites look upon it favorably, since it will potentially mean debt relief for them and more room to grow economically. Supporters of social movements look upon it positively for the same reason, though they probably wish it had a wider scope.

3. Despite its limited scope and stacked decision-making panel, elites, both political and economic, first-world and third-world, generally reacted unfavorably to IIA. It still has the ability to levy hefty fines, the existing agreement says nothing specific about ensuring corporations' rights (indeed, this provision was struck from the agreement), and its scope could potentially be widened. For this reason, most supporters of social movements are cautiously supportive of it. (In the real world, fines for violating the law usually amount to far less than the profits accumulated from these legal violations; many corporations simply treat fines as part of the cost of doing business. The IIA's hefty fines could potentially dramatically change this, depending on how strictly the Core Standards Commission interprets its mandate.)

Plantanoguay: 103. Plantanoguay seriously alienated international investors, but was able to build broad popular support for its policies and made moderate gains in the areas of equality and public health. Although international investors agreed with Plantanoguay's support for the IIC, they were displeased with it for supporting the IIA and adding the ILO Fundamental Conventions to the WTO's mandate. Plantanoguay's leadership in forming a debt repayment bloc also displeased international investors, since this would weaken the grip of the North on the South; the US and EU foreign aid program in Plantanoguay further weakened their support for the Plantanoguyan government, since it provided more room to press for a change of government. The general population of Plantanoguay was broadly supportive of the government's policies. The US and EU aid program did only a little to undermine popular support for the government, with most Plantanoguyans being politicized enough that they reacted favorably to the

government's campaign of aiding other Southern countries. Both the WTO's enforcement of the ILO Fundamental Conventions and the US/EU's aid program lead to slight gains in equality. These same things, plus the IIA's enforcement of safety and environmental standards, lead to slight gains in public health. (The IIC would have no effect on the equality and health indices, since Plantanoguay is a middle-income country unlikely to see any debt relief.)

Fabrikistan: 99. Although the government of Fabrikistan made significant gains in popular support, it seriously alienated international investors. Its actions left domestic elites divided (no net impact on score) and cumulatively had no impact on the local Muslim culture. The domestic elite were supportive of the IIC and of the debt repayment bloc, the latter of which would help build stronger ties with other Southern governments. They were, however, unhappy with the government's support for the IIA and the ILO Fundamental Conventions. The US/EU foreign aid program further turned some sectors of the elite against the government. Although international investors agreed with the government's support for the IIC, they were unhappy with every other move made by the government of Fabrikistan, with the US/EU foreign aid program reinforcing this. The government's actions attracted broad popular support, though this support was new and shaky enough that the US/EU aid program was able to turn a fair part of the population against the government. Although the debt repayment bloc would potentially have allowed Fabrikistan to build stronger ties with other Muslim countries, the US/EU aid program introduced a number of Western ideas into the country.

Banglabush: 100. The government of Banglabush moderately alienated both its domestic elites and international investors, but made modest gains in its employment rate. Both domestic and international elites were supportive of the IIC, but opposed the IIA and ILO Fundamental Conventions. The ILO Fundamental Conventions and the IIA increased the employment rate in Banglabush by strengthening the labor movement, while the prospect of debt relief from the IIC boosted the employment rate by making the country more inviting to long-term international investors.

CLR: 111. The CLR made modest gains in labor rights and substantial gains in poverty reduction. It also increased its support among its constituency significantly. The IIA and

WTO enforcement of the ILO Fundamental Conventions resulted in modest gains in labor rights. The IIC and the debt repayment bloc (lead by Plantanoguay and Fabrikistan) both contributed significantly to global poverty reduction by bringing some economic stability to the most impoverished countries. The US/EU aid program and the ILO Fundamental Conventions contributed modestly to poverty reduction as well. The CLR's successful support for the ILO Fundamental Conventions, the IIC and the IIA all boosted its constituency support, as did its alliance with the other Z-Team members and the campaigns they undertook against the A-Team and the newly formed IIC.

Interfaith Coalition: 112. The Interfaith Coalition made substantial gains in poverty reduction. It also increased its support among its constituency significantly. The IIC and the debt repayment bloc (lead by Plantanoguay and Fabrikistan) both contributed significantly to global poverty reduction by bringing some economic stability to the most impoverished countries. The US/EU aid program and the ILO Fundamental Conventions contributed modestly to poverty reduction as well. The Interfaith Coalition's successful support for the ILO Fundamental Conventions, the IIC and the IIA all boosted its constituency support, as did its alliance with the other Z-Team members and the campaigns they undertook against the A-Team and the newly formed IIC. Its choice of taking red zone actions during these campaigns, however, did alienate some members, despite its other successes.

WGA: 114. The WGA made substantial gains in improving the quality of life of women, especially those living in poverty in the third world. It also increased its support among its constituency significantly. The IIC and the debt repayment bloc (lead by Plantanoguay and Fabrikistan) both contributed significantly to the quality of women's live by reducing global poverty reduction through bringing some economic stability to the most impoverished countries. The US/EU aid program contributed modestly to poverty reduction as well. The ILO Fundamental Conventions slightly improved the status of women workers. (Women are disproportionately likely to be poor and are disproportionately employed in sweatshops--thus poverty reduction and labor rights measures contribute to the well-being of women.) The Interfaith Coalition's successful support for the ILO Fundamental Conventions, the IIC and the IIA all boosted its constituency support, as did its alliance with the other Z-Team members and the

campaigns they undertook against the A-Team and the newly formed IIC.

PPM: 109. The PPM saw a modest increase in the government's stability and modest gains in equality in Plantanoguay, while increasing its popular support by leaps and bounds. The Plantanoguyan government's stability increased both through the show of strength it made by getting international measures it supported passed and through the debt repayment bloc it formed with Fabrikistan, a move that gained it the support of other Southern countries. The US/EU aid program did undermine the stability of the government, but only in a minor way. The US/EU aid program contributed slightly to equality in Plantanoguay, as did the IIA and WTO's enforcement of labor rights. (The IIC has no effect on equality in Plantanoguay, since it is a middle-income country unlikely to see its debt forgiven.) The PPM's successful support for the ILO Fundamental Conventions, the IIC and the IIA all boosted its constituency support, as did its association with the government's debt repayment bloc and its alliance with the other Z-Team members and the campaigns they undertook against the A-Team and the newly formed IIC.

A-Team: 99. The A-Team lost modest amounts of support from investors and Northern political elites, but made gains in terms of Northern popular support. Investors and Northern political elites agreed with its support for the IIC, but though the support for the IIA was a bad move. The debt repayment bloc lead by Plantanoguay and Fabrikistan also undermined investor and Northern elite support for the A-Team, because this decreased the A-Team's control over Southern countries, making it a less useful instrument to Northern elites. The A-Team's support for the IIC and IIA significantly boosted its support among the Northern public, though this was somewhat reduced by the sight of a bloc of Southern countries helping other countries pay off their debts, which made the A-Team look stingy.

WTO: 98. The WTO suffered modest losses of support from global corporations, Northern political elites and Southern elites alike (though Southern elites less so than the other groups). All three groups agreed with its support for the IIC, but opposed its support for the IIA. Global corporations and Northern political elites feared that the WTO would be less useful as a tool to promote their interests if it was enforcing labor rights,

while Southern elites were afraid that it would be used against them.

US State Department: 104. The State Department broke even in terms of losses and gains in world power, made modest increases in terms of elite support and significant gains in terms of electoral support. The aid program to Plantanoguay and Fabrikistan and the IIC increased the State Department's world power by increasing its influence. Plantanoguay and Fabrikistan's debt repayment bloc, however, undermined its world power, by uniting a significant bloc of Southern countries into a coalition independent of the North. The IIA also slightly undermined its power by weakening the strength of the global corporations on which much of its power depends. Elites supported the IIC and the aid program to Plantanoguay and Fabrikistan, but saw the IIA and the ILO Fundamental Conventions as a bad idea. The State Department's support for the ILO Fundamental Conventions, the IIC, the IIA and its aid program to Plantanoguay and Fabrikistan all increased its electoral support, making it look like a benevolent international power.

European Union: 104. The EU broke even in terms of losses and gains in world power, made modest increases in terms of elite support and significant gains in terms of electoral support. The aid program to Plantanoguay and Fabrikistan and the IIC increased the EU's world power by increasing its influence. Plantanoguay and Fabrikistan's debt repayment bloc, however, undermined its world power, by uniting a significant bloc of Southern countries into a coalition independent of the North. The IIA also slightly undermined its power by weakening the strength of the global corporations on which much of its power depends. Elites supported the IIC and the aid program to Plantanoguay and Fabrikistan, but saw the IIA and the ILO Fundamental Conventions as a bad idea. The EU's support for the ILO Fundamental Conventions, the IIC, the IIA and its aid program to Plantanoguay and Fabrikistan all increased its electoral support, making it look like a benevolent international power.